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Industrial Fire Protection and Safety

Writer's picture: İsa Ersoyİsa Ersoy

Updated: Oct 23, 2024

Changes/improvements to industrial fire protection and safety are driven by horrific incidents. This can be characterized by certain causal factors.


  • Inadequate Hazard Analysis Studies

  • Insufficient Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance (ITM) Programs

  • Human factors

  • Ambiguous standard operating procedures/emergency response plans

  • Unfamiliarity of emergency response equipment (deluge, monitors, clean agents)

  • Emergency shutdowns

  • Planned turnarounds.

  • Inadequate emergency response training


A few of the noted industrial incidents within the last twenty years include the following.


BP Texas City refinery explosion occurred on March 23, 2005, when a flammable hydrocarbon vapor cloud ignited and violently exploded at the isomerization process unit of the BP oil refinery in Texas City, Texas, killing fifteen workers, injuring 180 others, and severely damaging the refinery. All the fatalities were contractors working out of temporary buildings located close to the unit to support turnaround activities.


The different panels and investigations found organizational failings including corporate cost-cuting, a failure to invest in the plant infrastructure, a lack of corporate oversight on both safety culture and major accident prevention programs, a focus on occupational safety as opposed to process safety, a defective management of change process (which allowed the siting of contractor trailers too close to the ISOM process unit), the inadequate training of operators, a lack of competent supervision for start-up operations, poor communication between individuals and departments and the use of outdated and ineffective work procedures which were often not followed.


The Buncefield fire was a major fire at an oil storage facility that started at 06:01 UTC on Sunday 11 December 2005 at the Hertfordshire Oil Storage Terminal, located near the M1 motorway, Hemel Hempstead, in Hertfordshire, England. The terminal was the fi􀅌h largest oil-products storage depot in the United Kingdom, with a capacity of about sixty million Imperial gallons (273 million liters) of fuel. There were forty-three reported injuries; two people were deemed to be seriously injured.


The investigation found that the level gauge had stuck at random times after a tank service in August 2005, but it did not concern maintenance contractors or site management. The independent shut-off switch was not fitted with a critical padlock to allow its check lever to work. Secondary containment (meant to trap the petrol in a retaining wall around the tank) failed and allowed petrol to flow out. Tertiary containment (drains and catchment areas to prevent release of spilled chemicals to the environment) also failed, and fuel and firefighting foam entered groundwater supplies. The investigation found secondary and tertiary containment to be inadequately designed and poorly maintained.


Deepwater Horizon, at approximately 7:45 pm CDT, on 20 April 2010, high-pressure methane gas from the well expanded into the marine riser and rose into the drilling rig, where it ignited and exploded, engulfing the platform. Eleven missing workers were never found despite a three-day U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) search operation and are believed to have died in the explosion. Ninety-four crew members were rescued by lifeboat or helicopter, seventeen of whom were treated for injuries. The Deepwater Horizon sank on the morning of 22 April 2010.


The ultimate cause of the Deepwater Horizon disaster was a series of preventable missteps by engineers and workers designing and conducting a drill plan in the weeks and hours preceding the event. The errors were later described in detail in a January 2011 report to the president created by the National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling — a team of engineers, politicians and scientists tasked by President Barack Obama with investigating what caused the explosion and oil spill.


As I look back a particular major incident that occurred on 23 October 1989 at approximately 1:05 PM Central Daylight Time, a series of explosions occurred at Phillips Petroleum Company's Houston Chemical Complex (HCC) in Pasadena, Texas, near the Houston Ship Channel. The initial blast registered 3.5 on the Richter scale, killed twenty-three employees and injured 314, and the resulting fires took 10 hours to bring under control, as efforts to battle the fire were hindered due to damaged water pipes for the fire hydrants from the blast. In actuality the entire plant fire water system was completed decimated by the series of explosions.


So, how can we prevent such tragedies? Were these incidents preventable? YES


Is your facility prepared for such an incident that we covered? Let us answer the topics described earlier with the causal factors.


1. Inadequate Process Hazard Analysis - A process hazard analysis (PHA) (or process hazard evaluation) is an exercise for the identification of hazards of a process facility and the qualitative or semi-quantitative assessment of the associated risk. A PHA provides information intended to assist managers and employees in making decisions for improving safety and reducing the consequences of unwanted or unplanned releases of hazardous materials. A PHA is directed toward analyzing potential causes and consequences of fires, explosions, releases of toxic or flammable chemicals and major spills of hazardous chemicals, and it focuses on equipment, instrumentation, utilities, human actions, and external factors that might impact the process.


There are several methodologies that can be used to conduct a Process Hazard Analysis (PHA), including:


  • Checklists

  • Hazard Identification (HAZID) reviews

  • What-if reviews and SWIFT

  • Hazard and Operability Studies (HAZOP)

  • Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA)


2. Insufficient Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance (ITM) Programs - Implementing a Fire Protection Inspection, Testing, & Maintenance Program for Water-Based Fire Protection Equipment. The best way to know that your systems are ready is through a documented inspection, testing, and maintenance (ITM) program. The primary standard in use in most companies and municipalities is NFPA® 25, Standard for the Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance of Water-Based Fire Protection Systems. NFPA 25 establishes the minimum requirements for the periodic inspection, testing, and maintenance of water-based fire protection systems.


3. Human factors - Human factors refer to the environmental, organizational and job factors, and human and individual characteristics, which influence behavior at work. All major accidents are caused by human failure in some way. Some human factors that commonly contribute to workplace accidents include:


  • Memory lapses (including forge􀆫ng a step in the work process or a safety measure)

  • Impaired judgment

  • Inattention or distraction

  • Negligence of basic safety rules

  • Lack of experience


4. Ambiguous standard operating procedures/emergency response plans - A standard operating procedure (SOP) is a set of step-by-step instructions compiled by an organization to help workers conduct routine operations. SOPs aim to achieve efficiency, quality output, and uniformity of performance, while reducing miscommunication and failure to comply with industry regulations. They provide clear instructions for workers to follow and are used in many industries to ensure safety and reliability. An emergency response plan is a set of written procedures for dealing with emergencies that minimize the impact of the event and facilitate recovery from the event. It is essential for ensuring a timely, proper, and effective response to a dangerous event. Actions taken as part of an emergency response plan might include sheltering in place, evacuations, placing a facility on lockdown, administering first aid, and alerting first responders.


5. Unfamiliarity of emergency response equipment – During an incident is not the time for your emergency response team or mutual aid teams to be unfamiliar with your plant’s emergency response equipment or procedures. Frequent refresher training and familiarization for mutual aid responders such as local municipalities are paramount! These would include the following.


  • Introduction of new chemicals in the facility, providing complete Safety Data Sheets

  • New fire equipment such as fire trucks, water tenders, rescue equipment, clean agents, etc.


6. Emergency shutdowns - The processes in your industrial plants need to run safely – every day, even in the event of danger. To reliably protect people and the environment, you need an emergency shut down system (ESD) that works constantly in the background. A system that does everything necessary to defuse a critical situation and ensure safe operation. A system that increases the availability of your plant and shuts it down in the event of danger. Use of a plant shutdown checklist. An emergency plant shutdown checklist typically includes the following steps:


  • Plant personnel accountability.

  • Notify relevant stakeholders about the emergency shutdown.

  • Keep non-essential personnel out of the plant or may include a partial evacuation.

  • Notification to the ERT, this may include activating the team on standby.


7. Planned turnarounds - A plant turnaround is a scheduled stoppage of part or all of a plant's operations. During this period Maintenance, inspections, and analysis are performed. Debottlenecking, revamps, capital project improvements, and catalyst regeneration projects may take place. Equipment repair or replacement, safety upgrades, and regulatory compliance are addressed. Emergency Response Managers should take full advantage of these planned activities and within full cooperation of plant management do the following:


  • Evacuation drill of the turnaround area, or the entire plant

  • If confined space is taking place in towers, tanks, or other process equipment plan a confined space rescue exercise.

  • Prior to start-up perform a Pre-Safety Start Up Review that includes fire protection equipment.


8. Inadequate emergency response training – Plant emergency responders should be trained in several response capabilities. These include but are not limited to:


  • Industrial Firefighting

  • Rope rescue

  • Confined space rescue

  • Hazardous Materials response

  • Pre-hospital medical care (First Responder or Emergency Medical Technician)

  • Command and Control


Emergency Response training programs are readily available worldwide. My suggestion would be that your organization conduct a thorough Fire Risk Assessment to determine your training needs. NFPA provides excellent standards for the following:


  • NFPA 1081 - NFPA 1081 training provides a solid foundation of knowledge and skills for emergency response personnel to safely resolve emergencies involving exterior fire at an industrial facility.


  • NFPA 1006 - NFPA 1006 Rope Rescue Training is designed to provide emergency responders with the skills and knowledge required to perform basic rope rescue operations using appropriate equipment, methodologies, and protocols.


  • NFPA 1006 Chapter 7 - course that introduces the skills needed to perform confined-space rescues safely and efficiently in industrial and municipal environments.


  • NFPA 472 - The NFPA 472 training course is a 40-hour program that provides participants with HAZMAT-specific response knowledge and skills. It is based on the NFPA 472 Standard for Professional Competence of Responders to Hazardous Materials Incidents.


  • First Responder or EMT – First responder training involves basic first aid whereas Emergency Medical Technician is more advanced training. At minimum, all emergency response team members should be trained at the First Responder level.


  • Command and Control – Is a standardized approach to the safe management of an incident. Training is available through recognized emergency response providers.


In conclusion I hope that this article provides insight into your organization’s needs. Do not let your organization become complacent. Stay on top of industry regulations and guidelines. Train, train, and keep training.


About the author


A dynamic and accomplished industrial fire protection and emergency response management with experience in strategic leadership, technical excellence, and operational management. Proven history of driving growth, innovation, and superior performance in industrial emergency response. Adept at developing and implementing robust emergency management plans and leading teams. Highly skilled in conducting risk assessments, ensuring compliance with industry standards, and enhancing emergency response capabilities. Visionary leader with passion for setting new benchmarks in fire safety and emergency management.




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